Back in law school, I learned about a concept in property law called adverse possession. In essence, if you openly go onto someone’s property without their permission and continuously stay there for the requisite period of time, you get to keep the property as your own. Today’s daf explores several situations in which a squatter claims to own land because they worked it — even in the absence of proof of ownership. In response, the land’s original owner offers excuses as to why they didn’t know the squatter was there and why the squatter shouldn’t get the land. After each scenario, Rava tenders a decision.
Back on 28a, the mishnah says that a person who works irrigated land or uses other types of property continuously for three years establishes a presumption of ownership. (Non-irrigated land has the same three-year requirement, but day-to-day usage isn’t necessary.) Set against this holding, the Gemara relates the following conflict between an owner and a possessor:
There was a certain person who said to another: What do you want with this house of mine?
The possessor said to him: I purchased it from you and I worked and profited from it for the years necessary for establishing the presumption of ownership.
Help us keep Jewish knowledge accessible to millions of people around the world.
Your donation to My Jewish Learning fuels endless journeys of Jewish discovery. With your help, My Jewish Learning can continue to provide nonstop opportunities for learning, connection and growth.
The claimant said to him: I was in the outer marketplaces and was unaware that you were residing in my house, and therefore did not lodge a protest, so your profiting does not establish the presumption of ownership.
The possessor said to him: I have witnesses that every year you would come here for 30 days and had an opportunity to know that I was residing in your house and to lodge a protest.
The claimant said to him: I was occupied with my business in the marketplaces for those 30 days.
Rava said: A person is apt to be occupied with business in the marketplace for all of 30 days, and accepted his claim.
Three years seems (to me) to be a long time to be in the outer marketplaces, and it also strikes me that the claimant’s original statement suspiciously leaves out regular visits to the area. But perhaps in the ancient world, which was far less connected by technology than our world, this is not so unreasonable. Rava certainly doesn’t think so and awards ownership to the man who didn’t know his property was worked by another for three years.
Here’s another case in which the waters are made muddier by a third, intermediary owner:
There was a certain person who said to another: What do you want with this land of mine?
The possessor said to him: I purchased it from so-and-so, who told me that he purchased it from you.
The claimant said to him: Don’t you concede that this land is formerly mine, and that you did not purchase it from me? Go away; I am not legally answerable to you.
Rava said: The claimant stated the halakhah to the possessor, as this is a legitimate claim, and Rava accepted his claim.
Here, the possessor’s claim is more tenuous: Instead of purchasing the land from the claimant directly, they purchased it from someone who said they purchased it from the claimant. Because of the middleman’s involvement, the possessor has a weaker case, and the claimant (original owner) gets to keep the property.
And there’s a third scenario, even more unexpected than the first two:
There was a certain person who said to another: What do you want with this land of mine?
The possessor said to him: I purchased it from so-and-so and then I worked and profited from it for the years necessary for establishing the presumption of ownership.
The claimant said to him: So-and-so is a robber who robbed me of the field, and he did not have the authority to sell it to you.
The possessor said to him: But I have witnesses that I came and consulted with you, and you said to me: Go purchase the land, indicating that you conceded that he had the authority to sell it.
The claimant said to him: The reason that I advised you to purchase it was because the second person (i.e., you, the possessor) is amenable to me, while the first (i.e., the purported thief) is more difficult than he.
Rava said: The claimant stated the halakhah to the possessor, as this is a legitimate claim, and Rava accepted his claim.
In this scenario, the original owner of the land agreed to let a supposed robber of the land sell to the squatter simply because he thought it would be easier to sue the squatter than it would be to sue the robber. Rava accepts this remarkable story and grants the claimant ownership which, frankly, leads me to wonder about his impartiality. After all, when the possessor asked the claimant’s advice about purchasing the property from the middleman, the claimant suggested that he do so. This seems to be the kind of deviousness that we’d want the law to prevent, but Rava nevertheless accepts this rather questionable legal argument.
The rabbis point out that Rava made a similar argument on Ketubot 109a, with an emphasis on the importance of a written deed over mere words. This highlights the extent to which the rabbis are skeptical of a possessor’s claims and inclined to favor the party with documentation.
Read all of Bava Batra 30 on Sefaria.
This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on July 25, 2024. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.
