The mishnah that begins at the bottom of yesterday’s daf discusses another case of ambiguous wording. Many of the mishnahs we have encountered in the past few chapters have discussed cases like these in which certain information is omitted, or vague statements are made, in the course of transacting a sale. But this mishnah discusses how we approach seemingly contradictory statements:
(If the seller says:) I am selling you a plot of land measured precisely with a rope more or less, ‘more or less’ nullifies ‘measured precisely with a rope.’ (If they say:) More or less measured precisely with a rope, ‘measured precisely with a rope’ nullifies ‘more or less.’ This is the statement of ben Nanas.
In both cases cited in the mishnah, the seller employs seemingly contradictory terms. On the one hand, they suggest that the plot of land being sold will be measured with a rope, which as we’ve already seen means that even the tiniest deviation from the specified size must be paid back to the affected party. On the other hand, the language of “more or less” implies a less precise measure, such that if the land doesn’t equal the stipulated measure, so long as it falls within a specified margin of error, the sale is valid and neither party requires recompense. Ben Nanas seems to suggest that when faced with two contradictory statements, we go by the latter one since we assume the seller has changed their mind.
The Gemara begins with a rather terse response:
Rabbi Abba bar Memel says that Rav says: Ben Nanas’s colleagues disagree with him.
Ben Nanas’s opinion may have been codified in the mishnah, but Rav wants to make clear that this is an individual opinion, not one held by the rest of the rabbis. The Gemara follows up by questioning the purpose of Rav’s statement. Apparently, we already have proof of the rabbis’ disagreement:
We learn (from a mishnah in Bava Metzia 102a): An incident in Tzippori involving one who rented a bathhouse from another for 12 gold dinars a year, one gold dinar per month (and the year was later intercalated, an extra month being added). The incident came before Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and before Rabbi Yosei, and they said: They should divide the (payment for the) intercalated month between them.
A mishnah in Bava Metzia already gave us a case of contradictory language and a ruling about what we should do about it. In that case, the rental fee for the bathhouse is stated to be one gold dinar per month and 12 gold dinars per year, which would normally be identical measures. But in the case of a leap year, which contains 13 months, this is no longer true. If we accept the language of one dinar per month as binding, the tenant should pay 13 gold dinars for the year.
But if we accept the language of 12 dinars for the year as binding, the extra month is immaterial and the annual rent is 12 dinars. In this case, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Yosei rule that because of the ambiguity, the rent for the extra month should be divided between the landlord and the tenant.
From this ruling, it should be obvious that ben Nanas’s colleagues disagree with him about how we handle a case of contradictory clauses. Rather than simply following the latter clause, the rabbis maintain it’s a case of uncertainty. So why did Rav have to explicitly note their disagreement here?
The Gemara replies:
If from there (the case of the bathhouse), I would say that it is only there (that they disagree), as it is possible to say that the landlord retracted (his first statement), but it is also possible to say that he is explaining (his first statement). But here (in the case related in our mishnah), where the seller certainly retracted (his first statement), one might say they do not disagree.
As is common, the Gemara resolves the seeming superfluity by distinguishing between the two cases. If it weren’t for Rav’s statement, I might have thought that the rabbis’ stance in the bathhouse case doesn’t necessarily contradict ben Nanas. That’s because in the case in Bava Metzia, it’s possible the landlord was merely explaining his first statement and it’s possible he was contradicting it. Since we’re uncertain, we split the difference. But perhaps in a case where the statements clearly contradict each other, everyone would agree with ben Nanas that the latter statement is the truest expression of the seller’s intent. Since this would be a viable conclusion, we need Rav’s statement to teach us that even in a case like that, the rabbis still don’t hold that the latter statement necessarily nullifies the first. Rather, the rabbis maintain that since the statements were spoken one after the other, we can’t automatically assume that the seller changed their mind, and therefore this too is a case of uncertainty.
Read all of Bava Batra 105 on Sefaria.
This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on October 8, 2024. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.
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