For the last daf, the Gemara has been trying to identify the principle dispute between the rabbis and Rabbi Meir with regard to the case of the motzi shem ra, a man who accuses his wife of not having been a virgin upon marriage. Rabbi Meir says only three judges are enough to try this case, whereas the rabbis require 23, because if it turned out she slept with another man while betrothed to her husband, that constitutes adultery, a capital crime. And, as we learned on the first page of this tractate, capital crimes are tried by a sanhedrin, a court of 23 judges.
This can’t be referring to a case where the husband has two witnesses that she committed adultery, for if so, it’s certainly a matter of capital law, and Rabbi Meir would have to agree that we require twenty three judges! So if this is not in fact the case, what’s the scenario and principle about which the Rabbis and Rabbi Meir are disagreeing?
A number of amoraim have offered their suggestions; on today’s daf, Ravina throws his hat into the ring:
Ravina says: The case is where one of the witnesses is found to be a close relative or a disqualified witness. And Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.
Ravina’s suggesting that the scenario referred to is one in which there are three or more witnesses to the adultery, but one of the witnesses is a relative of the accused or accuser, or one of the other people categorically excluded from witnessing (e.g. a thief, a gambler, etc.). Ravina proposes that the dispute of Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis maps onto a dispute between Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in interpreting Rabbi Akiva’s opinion with regard to how groups of three or more witnesses function:
As we learned in a mishnah (Makkot 5b) that Rabbi Akiva says: When the verse states: “At the mouth of two witnesses, or at the mouth of three witnesses, shall a person be put to death” (Deuteronomy 17:6), the third witness is mentioned only to be stringent with him, to make his status like these other two witnesses … And this teaches that just as in the case of two witnesses, if one of them is found to be a close relative or a disqualified witness their testimony is nullified, so too, in the case of three witnesses, if one of them is found to be a close relative or a disqualified witness their testimony is nullified. And from where is it derived that this applies even to a group of 100 witnesses? The verse states: “witnesses.”
Rabbi Akiva’s statement hinges on Deuteronomy’s apparently extraneous mention of “or three witnesses” when describing the testimony needed to sentence someone to execution. After all, if two witnesses are sufficient, wouldn’t this obviously be true of three? Rather, says Rabbi Akiva, the mention of a third witness is to teach about a case of edim zomemim, conspiring witnesses, who are punished with whatever punishment they attempted to mete out. If there are three conspiring witnesses attempting to impose capital punishment, Rabbi Akiva learns from this verse that all three receive the death penalty, even though the third’s testimony is extraneous. Since the verse conflates the set of two witnesses with a set of three, he declares that all three are treated alike. This conflation also applies to the matter of nullifying testimony: Since, if one of two witnesses is invalid, their testimony is nullified, so too if one of three or more witnesses is shown to be invalid, their entire testimony is nullified, even though there are two or more valid witnesses. Later tannaim dispute the application of this opinion about testimony’s nullification. Here is where we find the disagreement between Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi:
Rabbi Yosei says: In what situation is this statement said? In cases of capital law. But in cases of monetary law, the testimony may be upheld with the other witnesses. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: It applies to both cases of monetary law and cases of capital law. And when is this so? When the invalid witnesses also warned the transgressors as well; but when they did not warn the transgressors, no. If this were not to be so, what should two brothers and one other person do, if they saw someone kill another person?
Rabbi Yosei thinks that one invalid witness in a group of three or more disqualifies testimony for the purpose of a capital case no matter what, but for monetary law the other witnesses’ testimony stands. On the other hand, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi believes this disqualification is more expansive in that it applies to both capital and monetary law, but that its application in cases of capital law relies on a particular condition: the invalid witness having joined the others in issuing the transgressor a warning. If they did so, they actively joined themself to this group of witnesses, and have thereby invalidated the whole group’s testimony. But if they merely witnessed the event but did not participate, the other witnesses’ testimony stands. For if this weren’t so, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi points out, how would we ever judge a case where multiple relatives witnessed a murder, or some other capital crime? Their very act of having viewed it, even without participation, would render everyone’s testimony invalid.
Let’s rewind now. Ravina suggests that Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s dispute maps onto the case about which Rabbi Meir and the rabbis are disagreeing. If there are three or more witnesses to this woman’s adultery and one of them is an invalid witness, Rabbi Meir holds like Rabbi Yosei that the entire testimony is automatically invalidated, and therefore the husband’s claim is only relevant to costing his wife her ketubah and can be judged by three; whereas the rabbis hold that if the invalid witness didn’t join in issuing a warning, the remaining witnesses can still testify, and thus this is a case of capital law that requires 23 judges.
Are we done proposing explanations for the difference of opinion between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis in the mishnah? No, yet another explanation follows on today’s daf. But that’s enough for us here today
Read all of Sanhedrin 9 on Sefaria.
This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on December 26, 2024. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.
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