Sanhedrin 77

In the mishnah on yesterday’s daf, the rabbis discussed which specific actions render one liable for murder:

A murderer who struck another with a stone or with iron, or held him in the water or in the fire, and the victim could not extricate himself from there and he died, the murderer is liable.

If one pushed another into the water or into the fire and that person could have extricated himself from there, and he died, the one who pushed him is exempt (from charges of murder0. If one set a dog against another, or if one set a snake against another, the one who set it is exempt. If he caused the snake to bite him, Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable, and the rabbis exempt him.

The mishnah seems to consider two factors in determining when a person is liable for murder: whether the victim’s death was guaranteed by the killer’s actions and how immediately the death followed the killer’s actions. On today’s daf, Rava picks up on this thread when listing other cases of exemptions and liability:

Rava says: If one bound another and he died of starvation, he is exempt. And Rava says: If one bound another in the sun and he died (of the heat), or in a cold place and he died (of exposure), he is liable. (But if one bound another in a place that at the time was not exposed to the sun or the cold), even though ultimately the sun would arrive, or ultimately the cold would arrive, he is exempt.

Rava’s cases seem to diverge from one particular example in the mishnah — a case where someone was pushed into water or fire but could have escaped. In those scenarios, it’s not guaranteed that the killer’s actions would have led to death. But in Rava’s telling, someone bound in an extremely hot or cold place would inevitably die. Nonetheless, Rava seems to be picking up on the question of immediacy: Has the process of dying already begun with the killer’s actions or not?

In a case of starvation, Rashi and Tosafot clarify that at the moment a person is bound, they aren’t facing deadly hunger. This only comes later as a consequence of having been bound. In contrast, if someone is bound and left directly in the sun or the cold, at the moment they are bound they are already in direct contact with the force that will ultimately kill them. Therefore, the killer is liable because they are seen as having directly produced the ultimate cause of their death.

However, in the case where the sun or cold will eventually come, even if this is inevitable, the killer is exempt because at the moment of action, the cause of their death was not present and clear. This, Rashi notes, is a case of gerama, or indirect causation, a concept that comes up in both civil and capital law when determining liability. Though a person in the cases Rava listed may be exempt from capital punishment, Rashi notes that their judgment is still in the hand of heaven — that is, God will mete out their punishment.

Rava adds on several related cases:

And Rava says: If one bound another before a lion, he is exempt. If before mosquitoes, he is liable. Rav Ashi says: Even before mosquitoes he is exempt, as those (mosquitos) went and these came.

Rashi notes that the reason for exemption in the case of the lion is that even if the victim hadn’t been bound, they likely wouldn’t have been able to escape. By contrast, in the case of mosquitos, had they been able to run away they might not have met the same fate. Tosafot articulates the distinction differently: In the case of the lion, by default its attack has not begun at the time of action (otherwise how are we tying up the victim?), whereas the mosquitos may have already begun their biting.

Nonetheless, Rav Ashi deems someone exempt in the mosquito case as well, since it’s hard to prove that the mosquitos that ultimately kill the victim are the same ones who were present at the time of their binding. Those mosquitos might have flown off and another swarm arrived. In either case, the victim’s death had not already begun at the time of the killer’s actions.

It’s worth noting that the rabbis certainly are not articulating any of these scenarios as permissible. Even indirectly setting in motion someone’s death is not allowed. The question is only what level of immediate culpability and causation is required for us to take judgment into human hands and execute the killer.

Read all of Sanhedrin 77 on Sefaria.

This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on March 4, 2025. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.