The mishnah on page 146b taught that if a person on their deathbed gives away all of their property but then later recovers from their illness, the gift does not stand. However, if they hold back some land for themselves, their gift stands. The difference has to do with what we can infer about their intentions. By giving away all of their property, a person reveals that they expect to die imminently. The gift is retracted when the conditions upon which it was made turn out to be false. In the latter case, the person held back some land, suggesting that they thought there was a chance they might survive. And so, if they do survive, the gift stands.
On today’s daf, the Gemara asks about analogous deathbed distributions:
If a person on his deathbed consecrated all of their property to the Temple treasury, and subsequently recovered, what is the halakhah?
If a person declared all of their property ownerless, what is the halakhah?
If they distributed all their property to the poor, what is the halakhah?
Regarding the person who consecrated all of their property to the Temple, should their consecration be considered conditional, like a gift, and dependent upon their succumbing to their illness? Or does consecrated property operate differently? And for the one who declared all of their property ownerless, is this an indication that they are resolved to living a life without possessions and have no intention to reclaim it should they survive their illness? Or should we assume that their declaration is contingent upon their death? And similarly, for the one who distributed their wealth to the poor, should we treat this case as we do a simple gift, or is a gift of charity held to a different standard?
Although the mishnah is decisive about what we should do in the case of a gift to friends and family, the Gemara is unable to decide whether these three scenarios should be treated in the same way or if there is a compelling reason to hold the person to their words, effectively leaving them destitute. For all three cases, the Gemara declares teyku, these dilemmas stand unresolved.
But these cases do not remain unresolved forever. Yosef Karo, in the Shulchan Aruch (Judaism’s most authoritative law code), states that in all three of these cases we act as we would for a gift, meaning that regardless of how the person gave away all of their property, should they survive, their gift does not stand. Moses Maimonides, Karo’s predecessor, also rules to the benefit of the survivor, but with a slight difference. He says that if the person survives, they can retract their gift in each of these cases — but it’s not done automatically.
Why this additional requirement from Maimonides? The Maggid Mishnah, a commentator on Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah, suggests that this is because the Talmud left the cases undecided. In other words, if we are going to make a decision about a case (or three of them) for which the Talmud was unsure, we should be as certain as we can that what we are doing is the right thing to do. While the mishnah abrogates a death bed gift at the time of the person’s recovery, our lack of clarity about the rule in these three cases requires that the survivor first make clear to us that they intended to distribute their property only because they were certain that they would die. Only after they have done so can we act with certainty about a matter for which the Talmud was unable to decide.
Read all of Bava Batra 148 on Sefaria.
This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on November 20, 2024. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.
Help us keep Jewish knowledge accessible to millions of people around the world.
Your donation to My Jewish Learning fuels endless journeys of Jewish discovery. With your help, My Jewish Learning can continue to provide nonstop opportunities for learning, connection and growth.
