Today’s daf continues the discussion begun yesterday on rov v’karov: When something has indeterminate status, do we decide its status based on majority or proximity? A recent mishnah provided an example of an item of indeterminate status: a baby dove that is found apart from its dovecote and we do not know to whom it belongs. In the mishnah, we are told that if the lost dove is more than 50 cubits from a dovecote, it belongs to the finder. But if it’s found within 50 cubits of a dovecote, it is presumed to belong to the owner of that dovecote.
How do the principles of rov and karov work? Let’s go back to the hypothetical lost dove. If there are multiple dovecotes owned by different people nearby, we might assume the baby dove belongs to the owner of the largest and most populous dovecote and should be given to them (rov/majority), or we might assume it belongs to the owner of the dovecote that is closest and give it to them (karov/proximity). There might be a logical argument that the lost baby bird has equal likelihood of belonging to either dovecote and its value should be split. This is the question of rov versus karov.
At the beginning of our sugya (talmudic discussion), Rabbi Hanina insisted that, despite both majority and proximity being Torah-level principles, we always decide according to majority — that would send the baby bird in our hypothetical example back to the owner of the most populous dovecote. Multiple challenges were raised to his position, citing cases where we seem to prefer proximity over numbers (including the ruling about the dove in our mishnah), and each was resolved, albeit with some difficulty.
On today’s daf, Abaye comes to support Rabbi Hanina’s decision to rule according to majority by citing a different case:
Abaye said: We learn in a mishnah (Nidda 17b) as well that one follows the majority rather than proximity: With regard to blood that is found in the corridor (i.e., the cervical canal) and it is uncertain whether or not it is menstrual blood, it is ritually impure as menstrual blood, as there is a presumption that it came from the uterus, which is the source of menstrual blood. And this is the halakhah even though there is an upper chamber, which empties into the canal, which is closer.
With regard to the laws of niddah, family purity, only blood that comes from the uterus renders a woman niddah (ritually impure). By default, we treat any blood found in the cervical canal as menstrual blood, even though the rabbis believed (incorrectly) that there is another orifice, “the upper chamber,” which lies closer to the cervical canal than the uterus. While blood from this fictional “upper chamber” would be pure, our default assumption is that blood found in the cervical canal is from the uterus, as the significant majority of blood comes from there.
Rava initially dismisses this as a definitive proof:
Rava said to Abaye: You state a proof from a case where the factors of majority and frequency are both present. When there is majority and frequency, there is no one who says that one ignores the majority and follows proximity.
This introduces a third factor: frequency. Not only does a greater quantity of blood come from the uterus, but it comes with far greater frequency than blood from the imagined “upper chamber.” Everyone agrees that if you have both majority and another factor, like frequency, those determine our attribution; but this doesn’t prove that a majority alone is preferred over proximity.
The Gemara now takes a puzzling turn. Rava’s statement is followed by the citation “As Rabbi Hiyya teaches,” implying that what’s to come backs up his previous point:
As Rabbi Hiyya teaches: Blood that is found in the corridor is considered definite menstrual blood, and therefore if she engages in sexual intercourse, both she and her partner would be liable …
Rabbi Hiyya’s statement proves that in the case of blood found in the cervical canal, we definitively treat it as having originated in the uterus. Rava explains what we can deduce from this teaching:
And Rava says: Learn from that which Rabbi Hiyya said three conclusions: Learn from his statement that when the relevant factors are majority and proximity, follow the majority; and learn from his statement that the halakhah that one follows the majority applies by Torah law; and learn from his statement that there is a source for that which Rabbi Zeira said.
The final statement, about Rabbi Zeira, references the notion that majority wins over proximity, even without a second majority tipping the scale. But Rava’s entire statement is puzzling: Wasn’t he the one who just challenged Abaye’s assertion that in the case of majority and proximity, we always follow the majority? Didn’t he say that’s only definitively the case when we have the additional factor of frequency? The Gemara resolves this tension:
Rava retracted that claim.
As we often see in the Gemara, Amoraim often revise earlier statements upon encountering new information. While Rava initially believed we require both majority and frequency to determine the origin or status of something, in the end he agrees that a majority alone wins out over proximity.
Read all of Bava Batra 24 on Sefaria.
This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on July 19, 2024. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.
