Today’s daf continues a discussion begun on 43b about when a personal stake disqualifies someone from testifying in a case of contested ownership. Here’s a beraita from that page:
The sages taught: If one sold a house to another, or if he sold a field to him, he cannot testify about it (for the buyer against a claimant) because he is responsible for compensating the buyer. But if he sold a cow to him, or if he sold a cloak to him, he can testify about it because he is not responsible for compensating the buyer.
The beraita seems relatively straightforward: The distinction between the two cases hinges on whether the seller — who would be testifying — is obligated to compensate the buyer were someone else to claim the property. If they would be required to compensate the buyer, then they clearly have a stake in the outcome of the case and cannot be an impartial witness.
The problem for the Gemara is that this beraita is too straightforward: Indeed, it’s so obvious (to the rabbis), it’s not clear why it even needed to be stated. This is a problem because all teachings are expected to bring some new information to the table. On yesterday’s daf, therefore, Rav Sheshet presented a more convoluted explanation of this beraita:
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Rav Sheshet said: The first clause is stated with regard to the case of Reuven, who robbed Shimon of a field and sold it to Levi, and then Yehuda comes and contests Levi’s ownership, stating that it was actually his. Shimon cannot go to court to testify for Levi, because it is preferable for Shimon that the field be returned to Levi.
In Rav Sheshet’s explanation, rather than simply a buyer and seller, we have an original owner (Shimon), a robber (Reuven) and the person the robber sold the property to (Levi). According to him, the key difference between the two cases is whether the stolen property might eventually be returned to the person testifying. If it remains in Levi’s hands, and Shimon can later prove that Reuven stole the field and sold it to Levi, Shimon could reclaim the property; whereas if it ends up in the hands of this fourth party, Yehuda, Shimon would have no recourse. The main problem with Rav Sheshet’s reading, as noted by Abaye, is that it simply doesn’t align with the language of our beraita, which clearly states that the distinction between the two cases revolves around whether the seller must compensate the buyer were someone else to claim the property.
Since this is a strong disagreement, the Gemara turns to a different explanation:
Rather, explain it instead in accordance with the statement of Ravin bar Shmuel, as Ravin bar Shmuel says in the name of Shmuel: One who sells a field to another even without a guarantee cannot testify with regard to ownership of that field on behalf of the buyer, because he is establishing the field before his creditor.
Shmuel says that our beraita is, as it appears at first glance, referring to only a buyer and seller. Presumably, however, he’s motivated by the same question that prompted Rav Sheshet to propose his puzzlingly convoluted explanation: If we take the beraita at face value, it seems to be stating the obvious. Shmuel is able to provide an answer that sticks closer to the beraita’s text, arguing that the distinction is not only about whether a seller must compensate the buyer if someone repossesses the property, but whether it’s liened property from which the seller’s creditor could collect a debt. That is, if the land remains in the hands of the buyer, and then the seller defaults on a loan, the creditor can collect land sold to other parties after the loan was taken. If the land were to be claimed by an unrelated party in this court case, the creditor would be unable to lay claim to it, and the seller/debtor would gain a reputation as an unreliable borrower. Therefore, he has a stake in the court proceedings and can’t be a witness.
Shmuel’s answer, while closer to the text, still has to contend with multiple problems: Isn’t this distinction also obvious, as we know land is liened and movable property is not? Doesn’t this still match poorly with the beraita’s language about whether the seller is liable to compensate the buyer? The Gemara addresses these questions as well. Overall, it’s an excellent example of a common phenomenon in the Gemara in which seemingly straightforward texts are given unexpected interpretations because the simplest reading is so obvious as to be thought extraneous. The rabbis assume there must be a chiddush, a new and non-obvious teaching, leading to these intricate and creative attempts at explanation.
Read all of Bava Batra 44 on Sefaria.
This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on August 8, 2024. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.
