In the Talmud, acquiring a large, immovable good — like land — is accomplished by means of payment, contract or taking possession. Smaller goods, however, that can be physically moved, are frequently acquired through actual movement. Yesterday, we saw just how complicated that can be when we considered whether, for instance, the cup used to measure grain in fact acquires that grain for the buyer, or if the buyer has to actually lift and remove the grain from the place of purchase. We learned that it depends on several factors including where the transaction takes place (in the seller’s domain, the buyer’s domain or a third party’s domain) and who owns the measuring cup. Today, the Gemara surfaces a mishnah from Kiddushin that seems to contradict some of what we learned yesterday:
We learned elsewhere (Kiddushin 26a): Property that is guaranteed (i.e., land) is acquired by means of money, or by means of a bill or by taking possession of it. And property that does not have a guarantee (i.e., movable property) can be acquired only by means of pulling.
At first glance, this seems out of step with what we’ve learned. Pulling means laterally removing the item. But yesterday, we learned that lifting the item, or sometimes even just measuring it out (in the case of grain), can effect the transaction. To address this concern, the Gemara supplies an interpretive tradition that limits the scope of this mishnah:
In Sura they taught the following halakhah in the name of Rav Hisda, while in Pumbedita they taught it in the name of Rav Kahana, and some say in the name of Rava: They taught this (the mishnah quoted above, that says acquisition is only through pulling) only with regard to items that are not typically lifted. In the case of items that are typically lifted, then yes, they are acquired by means of lifting, and they are not acquired by means of pulling.
The rabbis in Babylonia taught that pulling is not the only method of acquiring property, and it is in fact ineffective in cases where lifting is possible. In other words, they preferred lifting as the ideal means of acquiring movable property, with pulling as a fallback when objects can’t be lifted.
But this interpretation receives pushback:
Abaye sat and related this halakhah. Rav Adda bar Mattana raised an objection to Abaye from a beraita: One who steals a purse on Shabbat is liable for theft, because he already became liable for the theft as soon as he lifted the purse. This occurred before he came to violate the prohibition of performing prohibited labor on Shabbat.
How is purse-snatching on Shabbat relevant to the laws of legitimate purchase? We have a general principle that when a person violates two or more laws with the same act, they only face the greater punishment. This would mean that if a person simultaneously stole a purse and violated Shabbat, they wouldn’t be liable to pay for the theft, as they’re instead liable for death by stoning on account of breaking Shabbat. In the case of a purse that is lifted and then removed, however, the snatcher is liable for the theft, which means they must have acquired the purse (by lifting it) before they broke Shabbat (by moving it four cubits or transferring domains). This shows that lifting the purse acquires it.
So far, this is consistent with the principle of lifting as an effective means of acquisition, but the beraita continues:
If he did not lift the purse but was dragging it on the ground and exiting the private domain, continuously dragging and exiting, he is exempt from theft, as the prohibition of performing labor on Shabbat and the prohibition of theft are violated simultaneously.
If a person is dragging rather than lifting the purse, they only acquire it once they’ve pulled it out of the domain of the owner. In doing so, they simultaneously violate Shabbat by transferring an object from one domain to another and violate the prohibition of theft in acquiring the object. Since the thief has violated both prohibitions in the same act, they are only liable for breaking Shabbat (which carries the harsher punishment). This poses a challenge to the interpretation of the mishnah above: If a person violates the prohibition of theft by pulling the purse, it must mean they acquire the purse when pulling it. This is despite the fact that a purse is (we would assume) an object that can be lifted, which according to the rabbis in Babylonia should only be acquired through lifting.
Abaye resolves the challenge:
Abaye said to him: The beraita is referring to a case where the thief pulled the purse with a rope.
Rav Adda bar Mattana responded: I also state my question even in a case where he pulled the purse with a rope.
Abaye said to him: I meant that the beraita is referring to an item that requires a rope.
Abaye clarifies that this is a case where the item requires a rope for dragging, which implies it cannot be lifted (a heavy purse, indeed!). In this instance, the rabbis concede that pulling is an effective means of acquisition.
The Gemara will continue to pose challenges, as it goes up against a seemingly authoritative interpretation that suggests lifting is the preferred — and, at times, sole effective — form of acquiring movable objects. It will also challenge a number of sources that align better with our original mishnah and indicate pulling as the predominant method. The push pull continues.
Read all of Bava Batra 86 on Sefaria.
This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on September 19, 2024. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.
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