In its ongoing exploration of conspiring witnesses, today’s daf addresses a basic question: How can we tell if two witnesses are in fact conspiring?
The answer, at its most basic, is: from the testimony of another pair of witnesses. The mishnah says that when a second pair of witnesses testifies that the first pair was not in a position (literally) to witness the transgression in question, they are deemed conspirators. The Gemara then fleshes this out with examples:
Rava says: Two witnesses came and said: “So-and-so killed a person to the east of a building,” and two other witnesses came to court and said to the first set: “But were you not with us to the west of the building at that time?” We see: If, when people are standing to the west of the building they see to the east of the building, these witnesses are not conspiring witnesses. But if it is not possible to see from one side of the building to the other, these witnesses are conspiring witnesses.
This seems entirely reasonable. If seeing from one side of the building to the other is physically possible, it’s plausible that the distance was no obstacle to witnessing the defendant’s action; if not, the witnesses are clearly conspiring.
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The sheer reasonableness of this stance prompts the Gemara to ask why it’s even worth mentioning:
Isn’t that obvious? The Gemara answers: Lest you say: Let us be concerned about the possibility that these witnesses have particularly good eyesight. Therefore, Rava teaches us that one does not take that possibility into account.
In principle, it’s possible the view across the building is quite far or obstructed, but the two witnesses then claim to have extraordinary eyesight, enabling them to see what happened. While acknowledging the possibility, the Gemara takes Rava’s point to be that we should conclude the witnesses are more likely conspirators than superheroes.
Let’s consider another, analogous scenario:
And Rava says: If two witnesses came and said: “So-and-so killed a person in Sura in the morning on Sunday,” and two other witnesses came to court and said to the first set: “In the evening on Sunday you were with us in Neharde’a,” we see: If one is able to travel from Sura to Neharde’a from morning until evening they are not conspiring witnesses. And if it is not possible to travel that distance in that period of time, they are conspiring witnesses.
Again, we’re presented with a question of what’s possible: If the two witnesses were seen quite far from the scene of the crime only hours later, and traveling from one place to the other within the relevant time period was next to impossible, they’re likely conspirators. But again, why does Rava have to point this out? Isn’t it obvious?
Lest you say: Let us be concerned about the possibility that these witnesses traveled on a flying camel. Therefore, Rava teaches us that one need not take that possibility into account.
We’ve repeatedly seen how imaginative the Talmudic sages can be. Sometimes they describe themselves and their colleagues as having superhuman powers. But in court, the rabbis’ credulity isn’t infinite. The legal setting is not the place to let our minds take flights of fancy — on camels or otherwise. Rather, knowing that someone will suffer either way a case is decided, for the best judicial outcome, we must focus on what is most probable.
Read all of Makkot 5 on Sefaria.
This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on April 10, 2025. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.
