While most accidental killers are, by Jewish law, exiled to a city of refuge, in some cases they are not. The mishnah on Makkot 9b listed some examples, including this one:
The enemy of the victim is not exiled.
Rabbi Yosei says: Not only is an enemy not exiled, but he is executed by the court, because his status is like that of one who is forewarned.
Rabbi Shimon says: There is an enemy who is exiled and there is an enemy who is not exiled. This is the principle: In any case where an observer could say he killed knowingly, the enemy is not exiled. If it is clear he killed unknowingly, he is exiled.
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When it comes to unintentional killing, the relationship between the parties matters. An “accident” that leads to the death of one’s enemy might justifiably be viewed with skepticism. Rabbi Yosei goes so far as to argue that when it comes to the death of one’s enemy, there are no accidents and the killer should always be sentenced to execution. But Rabbi Shimon leaves room for the possibility of such an accident, even between enemies.
To figure out how this might work in principle, it helps to consider a concrete example. The Gemara cites a beraita which supplies just that:
It is taught: In what circumstances did Rabbi Shimon say that there is an enemy who is exiled and there is an enemy who is not exiled? If a rope snapped and the object attached to the rope fell and killed a person, he is exiled. But if an object was displaced from his hands, he is not exiled.
This is the case of death by proverbial piano. For Rabbi Shimon, if the rope bearing its heavy load snaps, while it’s theoretically possible someone could have intentionally weakened the rope, the likeliest explanation is that this was an accidental death. However, if the rope slipped out of the person’s hand, there is a distinct possibility that they intentionally let it slip, and therefore Rabbi Shimon would conclude this was an intentional killing. In that case, the person holding the rope is not exiled; instead, he is sentenced for murder.
The Gemara points out an apparent contradiction between Rabbi Shimon’s view, as expressed in this beraita, and an opinion attributed to him in a different beraita:
But isn’t it taught in another beraita that Rabbi Shimon says: A person is never exiled unless his trowel was displaced from his hand. The apparent contradiction between a case where the rope snapped, according to the first beraita, and a case where the rope snapped, according to the second beraita, is difficult. And the apparent contradiction between a case where the object was displaced, according to the first beraita, and a case where the object was displaced, according to the second beraita, is difficult.
The first beraita in the name of Rabbi Shimon states that an enemy whose rope snapped would be exiled, while an enemy who let the rope slip would be considered a murder and therefore is not exiled. But the second beraita states that a person who drops a trowel on a bypasser — which is analogous to dropping a rope because it falls directly from the hand — is considered an accidental killer. So which is the true accident? The Gemara proposes a resolution:
The case in the second beraita is referring to a friend of the victim, and that case in the first beraita is referring to an enemy of the victim.
Since the second beraita doesn’t specify that the victim was an enemy, the Gemara solves the problem by assuming the second beraita is talking about a situation in which the victim is a friend. In that case, we do not conclude the person dropped the trowel on purpose and we rule an accidental death. But let’s look again at the language of the beraita: It says the killer is “never” exiled unless the trowel fell from his hand. This means that in other circumstances of the trowel falling, we consider the death intentional. Once again, the relationship between the parties strongly affects the final ruling.
Many early talmudic commentators are troubled by the Gemara’s text as we have it. Because while dropping the trowel from one’s hand is ruled an accident, dropping a rope holding the trowel incurs no exile — and therefore, according to how we’ve read other texts, is deemed murder. How can this act, which when done to an enemy is ruled an accidental death, be deemed intentional when done to a friend? The explanation proposed by the Ramban is this: Usually, when we say someone is not exiled, what we mean is that we assume murderous intent and prosecute for intentional killing. But in the case of the second beraita, when a friend accidentally kills another because their rope snapped, the friend is not even exiled, because we assume this to be a circumstance that was not only unintentional but completely beyond their control. Hopefully, the family of the victim will view it that way as well and there will be no attempt at a vengeance killing — therefore no need for the city of refuge.
Read all of Makkot 9 on Sefaria.
This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on April 17, 2025. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.
