The mishnah on Sanhedrin 60b declares that idol worship is punishable by stoning, and lists actions that are considered worship: offering an animal to the statue, burning incense before it, pouring out libations, bowing down to it and verbally declaring its divinity. The second clause of that mishnah lists actions that are forbidden, but do not incur the death penalty:
One who hugs an idol, one who kisses it, one who cleans it, one who sprays water before it, one who washes it, one who rubs it with oil, one who dresses it, one who puts its shoes on it, he transgresses a prohibition. One who vows in an idol’s name and one who affirms his statement by an oath in its name, he transgresses a prohibition.
The mishnah says that one who performs these acts of affection that are not typical forms of worship is over bi’lo ta’aseh, transgressing a negative commandment. This is a phrase used to indicate a Torah-level prohibition whose violation does not merit capital punishment. So what form of punishment does this sort of action merit? Today’s daf explains:
When Rav Dimi came from the land of Israel to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Elazar says: For all of these actions one is flogged, with the exception of one who vows in an idol’s name and one who affirms his statement by an oath in its name.
The normal punishment for violating a negative commandment is 39 lashes; Rav Dimi suggests that all the actions listed above merit this punishment, except those which are purely verbal. Naturally, the Gemara asks:
What is different about one who vows in an idol’s name and one who affirms an oath in its name, that they are not flogged? It is because they are each an example of a prohibition that does not involve an action. One who performs them violates a general prohibition, and one is not flogged for violating a general prohibition.
Many hold that transgressing a lo ta’aseh, a negative commandment, without performing a physical action doesn’t render one liable for punishment; therefore, we can see a rationale for Rabbi Elazar’s exemption. But it seems like this exemption should also apply to the acts of hugging, kissing and cleaning, because they fall under another exempt category of lo ta’aseh: a “general prohibition.”
The Gemara cites a beraita that demonstrates this principle: From the line “You shall not eat with the blood” (Leviticus 19:26) one derives a prohibition on eating a live animal and eating a sacrifice whose blood hasn’t been sprinkled, the command to withhold a meal from those who are mourning people executed by the court, the prohibition on a sanhedrin who’s carried out an execution eating for the remainder of the day and the prohibition on the behavior of a gluttonous “stubborn and rebellious son.” Since so many commands are located in this one verse, they are considered to be a “general prohibition;” at the end of the beraita, Rabbi Hiyya bar Avin clearly states that we don’t flog someone for violating a general prohibition. According to this stance, if a prohibition was lumped in with a number of others, one can’t be punished for that individual transgression; only if the prohibition is singled out by the Torah can one receive punishment.
Since the acts of hugging, kissing, etc. are all derived from the broad principle of “Do not serve them” (Exodus 20:5), it seems that for these, too, one should be exempt from punishment. So why does Rabbi Elazar state that they merit flogging?
Rather, when Ravin came from the land of Israel to Babylonia, he related a different version of what Rabbi Elazar says: For all of the transgressions listed in the mishnah one is not flogged, with the exception of one who vows in an idol’s name and one who affirms his statement by an oath in its name.
Ravin reverses the order of Rabbi Elazar’s statement as conveyed by Rav Dimi, arguing that the speech acts are the only ones in this clause for which one is flogged. But the Gemara presents its same challenge in reverse: If one isn’t flogged for the kissing and hugging because these are an exception by virtue of stemming from a general prohibition, shouldn’t one also be exempt when vowing or affirming, since these are violations with no concrete action?
Here, though, the Gemara has a resolution:
That halakhah of Rabbi Elazar is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says with regard to a prohibition that does not involve an action that one is flogged for violating it.
While the dominant stance is that any violation which doesn’t consist of a physical action doesn’t merit physical punishment, Rabbi Yehuda believes that even violations that are speech acts or failures to act can merit flogging; therefore, Ravin’s version of Rabbi Elazar — in which the kissing and hugging are exempt but vowing or affirming merits flogging — could be in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion.
There’s something intuitive to both these exemptions. While Judaism does imbue many speech acts with significance, they’re not generally viewed as causing the same harm as concrete actions; and if a prohibition is lumped in with a whole list of others, all of which are tacked onto one verse, it seems to indicate that we accord less significance to that particular action. And yet, particularly in the case of “a prohibition with no action,” we see some pushback: Judaism does accord speech acts significance, we do believe they impact the world around us, and people should be held accountable even for damage done by words.
Read all of Sanhedrin 63 on Sefaria.
This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on February 18, 2025. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.
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